You do not find your own face faster; you just look at it longer by Devue, Christel et al.
In press in Cognition.                Important stimuli and allocation of attention 
Status: Postprint (Author’s version) 
 1 
 
You do not find your own face faster; you just look at it longer 
 
Christel Devue1,2, Stefan Van der Stigchel2, Serge Brédart1, and Jan Theeuwes2 
 
1
 Cognitive Science Department, Université de Liège, Belgium 
2
 Cognitive Psychology, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, the Netherlands 
 
Abstract 
Previous studies investigating the ability of high priority stimuli to grab attention reached 
contradictory outcomes. The present study used eye tracking to examine the effect of the 
presence of the self-face among other faces in a visual search task in which the face identity 
was task-irrelevant. We assessed whether the self-face (1) received prioritized selection (2) 
caused a difficulty to disengage attention, and (3) whether its status as target or distractor had 
a differential effect. We included another highly familiar face to control whether possible 
effects were self-face specific or could be explained by high familiarity. We found that the 
self-face interfered with the search task. This was not due to a prioritized processing but 
rather to a difficulty to disengage attention. Crucially, this effect seemed due to the self-face’s 
familiarity, as similar results were obtained with the other familiar face, and was modulated 
by the status of the face since it was stronger for targets than for distractors. 
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Introduction 
When we open our eyes, we receive a large amount of visual information. Because our visual 
system has a limited capacity, selection must occur to prioritize important stimuli while 
ignoring less important ones. For almost fifty years, debates have opposed partisans of an 
early selection of attention (Broadbent, 1958), to whom this attentional selection concerns the 
gross stimulus features at an early stage of processing, to partisans of a late selection of 
attention (Deutsch & Deutsch, 1963), to whom the attentional selection takes place after 
semantic processing of all the incoming information. To resolve these debates, highly 
important stimuli (e.g., one’s own name) have been used, trying to determine whether they 
can be processed in conditions where they are supposedly unattended. These studies led to 
contradictory outcomes. 
Since the publication of the seminal study by Moray (1959), the interest in investigating self-
referential material grew over the last few decades. Using a shadowing procedure during a 
dichotic listening task, Moray showed that participants were better in remembering that they 
heard their own name presented to one ear relative to other words while repeating aloud (.i.e. 
shadowing) a message presented to the other ear. However, these results were later criticized 
because there was no way to exclude the possibility that participants shifted their attention 
from time to time to the to-be-ignored ear, hence attending to the message displayed to that 
ear and therefore perceiving it (see Lachter, Forster, & Ruthruff, 2004, that confirmed this 
criticism using a priming paradigm). Nonetheless, Wood and Cowan (1995) later replicated 
Moray’s results with more careful control of temporal lapses of attention (i.e. they used the 
accuracy and speed of shadowing as online measures of attentional shifts). They found that 
participants who recalled their own name showed a disruption in shadowing shortly after the 
presentation of their own name but, importantly, not before or while the own name was 
presented. In a visual analog of Moray’s paradigm in which participants were instructed to 
make a parity judgment on two digits flanking a to-be-ignored word (that was their own name 
on some trials), 80% of participants reported that they had seen their own name whereas they 
only recognized 68% of words presented in similar conditions (Wolford & Morrison, 1980). 
In addition, the presence of the participant’s own name affected response times relative to 
neutral words. According to the authors, their results argue in favour of a robust name effect 
(but see e.g. Bundesen, Kyllingsbaek, Houmann, & Jensen, 1997). However, given the fact 
that the to-be-ignored stimuli were presented at fixation, they were located within the focus of 
attention and were presumably attended, preventing any strong conclusion in favour of a late 
selection theory of attention. Subsequently, other studies demonstrated that one’s own name is 
particularly resistant to the attentional blink (Shapiro, Caldwell, & Sorensen, 1997) and to 
repetition blindness (Arnell, Shapiro, & Sorensen, 1999) during rapid serial visual 
presentations when compared to other names or nouns. In the inattentional blindness 
paradigm, the own name is also less subject to blindness than other names or frequent words 
(Mack & Rock, 1998). Additionally, Mack and Rock (1998) showed that the own name pops 
out of a display of up to 12 items in a visual search task (but see Harris, Pashler, & Coburn, 
2004 who obtained search slopes that were not flat enough to claim that the own name pops 
out, although it was detected more rapidly than other names). 
However, Bundesen et al. (1997) showed that one’s own name does not automatically attract 
attention. In their experiment two white-coloured (to-be-ignored distractors) and two red-
coloured (to-be-reported targets) names were presented. The own name was presented on 
some trials as target or as distractor. The own name presented as distractor did not cause more 
interference than other names but participants were more accurate in reporting their own name 
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presented as targets than in reporting targets from display only having other names. However, 
a control experiment showed that this advantage for the own name presented as target was not 
attentional, but rather reflected a better identification of the participant’s own name compared 
with other names. Other studies later demonstrated that one’s own name summons attention 
when participants are set to identify target names but not when participants are set to find the 
colour of a target (Kawahara & Yamada, 2004). Similarly, in a Stroop-like task, the own 
name attracted attention if presented centrally within the participant’s attentional focus but 
when presented peripherally, it attracted attention only when it was task-relevant but not when 
it was task-irrelevant (Gronau, Cohen, & Ben-Shakhar, 2003). 
More recent studies have examined the attentional properties of another self-referential 
stimulus, the self-face, and also found contrasting results. For instance, Laarni et al. (2000) 
found that only 18% of participants reported the presence of their own face in the background 
while they were performing a matching task on two faces presented at foreground. Similar 
results were obtained with a famous face (the Finnish President). Conversely, Brédart, 
Delchambre and Laureys (2006) found that the self-face flanking a classmate’s name in a 
face-name interference paradigm produced a stronger interference on the processing of this 
name than in the reverse situation (i.e., when a classmate’s face flanked the participant’s own 
name). This suggests that the self-face also has some attention-grabbing capacity. Similarly, 
Tong and Nakayama (1999) showed that the self-face was more quickly detected among 
distractors than strangers’ faces, even when presented in atypical orientations and after 
hundreds of trials. 
In sum, existing data do not unanimously support the late selection view (Deutsch & Deutsch, 
1963) that suggests that stimuli of particular importance with particular meaning (such as self-
referential material) would attract attention. Nonetheless, a careful examination of the 
different paradigms and conditions used in previous studies might help resolving some of the 
discrepancies between the studies. It seems that “self-effects” were mostly found when self-
referential stimuli were presented centrally, within the participant’s focus of attention (see 
e.g., Arnell et al., 1999; Gronau et al., 2003-Experiment 1; Shapiro et al., 1997; Wolford & 
Morrison, 1980). In that case however, it is difficult to conclude that self-referential stimuli 
capture attention since they were already within the focus of attention. In such a situation, 
their processing was presumably inevitable when attending to the target items because they 
were also located centrally. By contrast, when self-referential stimuli were presented outside 
the focus of attention, they produced specific effects when their processing was somehow 
related with the task at hand (see e.g., Brédart et al., 2006; Gronau et al., 2003-Experiment 3) 
but they generally failed to elicit specific performance in conditions that rendered their 
processing completely irrelevant (see e.g. Bundesen et al., 1997; Gronau et al., 2003-
Experiment 2; Laarni et al., 2000). 
Overall, this might suggest that, in particular conditions, rather than capturing attention self-
referential stimuli seems to hold attention. In addition, the extent to which the distractor does 
or does not share some properties (e.g., in terms of spatial location, of semantic relationship, 
etc.) with the target seems important. Therefore, on the one hand, the lack of coherence in 
previous studies could be partly due to a lack of differentiation between the capture and 
retention components of attention and, on the other hand, to the properties of the self-
referential stimuli in the context of a given experiment. 
As a consequence, in the present study, we used the eye tracking technique to investigate 
more precisely the way in which attention is allocated when the self-face is presented among 
unfamiliar faces during a visual search task. Typically, in a visual search task participants are 
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required to divide attention over multiple elements in the display ensuring that attention 
cannot be focused on one element. Coupled with eye movements recording, it allows an 
exhaustive examination of both early (e.g. attentional capture reflected by a direct saccade 
towards the stimulus) as well as later (e.g. preferential allocation or shifts of attention 
reflected by following saccades and fixations) stages of attentional allocation (see e.g. 
Weierich, Treat, & Hollingworth, 2008). We put three main questions: (1) Do our eyes go 
faster to the self-face than another face? In other words, is the self face prioritized in visual 
search? ; (2) Once attending a face, do our eyes stay longer on the self-face than on another 
face? In other words, does the self-face hold attention? ; (3) Are these potential effects 
dependent on the status of the self-face as target or distractor? In order to disentangle “self-
effects” from mere familiarity effects, we included another highly familiar face (a friend’s 
face) in the experiment. We designed a visual search task in which participants searched an 
array of familiar and unfamiliar faces looking for a face with a particular configuration 
resulting from the pronunciation of a specific sound. The task implied processing facial 
features but without the need to process the facial identity. Therefore, the familiarity and 
identity of the faces were completely task-irrelevant but their processing remained possible in 
the conditions of the task. Moreover, the task-relevant features were neutral with respect to 
emotional content in order to prevent any effect of other confounding emotional variables. 
Method 
Participants. Twenty-two participants (four males) were recruited by gender-matched pairs so 
that each of them served as the friend for the other participant. They had to know each other 
for at least 6 months (mean relationship duration = 20 months), were engaged in a positive 
relationship and saw each other on a regular basis (i.e., they were classmate or friends). 
 
Figure 1. Sample face stimuli showing a [m] sound (top) and an [o] sound (bottom). 
Stimuli. Twenty-two individuals (11 females and 11 males) had been photographed to be used 
as unfamiliar faces, in a frontal position while pronouncing a [m] and an [o] (i.e., two easily 
producible and differentiated phonemes, see Figure 1). Each participant in the experiment was 
also photographed in similar conditions, the two pictures being used as “self-face” for 
him/herself and as “friend’s face” for his/her friend. All pictures were converted in greyscales. 
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Hair below the ear lobes and neck were removed so that all faces had an overall oval shape. 
Faces were placed in a uniformed light grey background and resized to subtend 2.9 degrees in 
height and around 2.1 degrees in width. The self-face was presented in a mirror orientation. 
Procedure. Participants were individually tested in a dim-lighted room. They were maintained 
at a 75 cm distance from the computer screen by means of a chinrest. Eye movements were 
measured with an Eye Link II eye tracking system with 500 Hz sampling rate. Participants 
were instructed to judge whether a target face was present or absent in a 6-faces display (see 
Figure 2) by means of two response keys. For half of the participants the target face displayed 
a [m] and remaining distractors displayed an [o]. The reversed situation was presented to the 
remaining half of participants. Participants received no instruction about the presence of 
familiar faces. Each trial began with a fixation cross that participants were instructed to stare 
at until the presentation of the faces. After 500 ms, 6 faces positioned on a virtual circle at 8.3 
degrees around fixation appeared until a response was made (up to 3 seconds), followed by a 
blank of 1000 ms. If participants moved their eyes away from fixation (1.3 degrees) before the 
pictures onset, they heard a “beep” sound. They received a visual feedback in case of 
incorrect or too slow responses. 
 
Figure 2. Illustration of a 6-faces display in which a target is present ([o] target among [m] 
distractors). 
The test included 288 trials presented in a random order. A target was present in 50% of these 
trials. Each familiar face was presented a total of 72 times (the self-face on 25% of trials and 
the friend’s face on 25% of trials) distributed as follows: half the time in the absent target 
condition (36 times) and every other time in the present target condition (36 times). In that 
latter case, each familiar face was the target once out of 6 (6 times) and it was a distractor the 
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5 remaining times out of 6 (30 times). Each familiar face was always presented along with 5 
unfamiliar faces. Hence, the processing of the familiar faces was completely irrelevant for the 
task and the presence of one of these faces was totally unpredictable of the correct response. 
Displays were only composed of unfamiliar faces in the remaining 50% of trials that were 
distributed as follows: 72 trials with a target present and 72 trials with no target. The 
unfamiliar faces were picked up randomly among the set of 22 unfamiliar faces with the 
constraint that two identical faces could not appear within the same trial. Each individual 
unfamiliar face had thus the same probability to be presented as each familiar face (in 25% of 
trials) and the same probability to be presented as a target (2.1%) or as a distractor (22.9%)1. 
Before the test, participants performed a 48-trials training session composed of 6 additional 
unfamiliar faces that were not presented during the test. 
Design and data analysis. We first examined the effect of the Condition (target present vs. 
target absent) and of the inclusion of a familiar face within the display (Display type: self-
face, friend’s face, all unfamiliar faces) on mean reaction times (RTs) and on mean number of 
saccades. The mean number of saccades was the number of eye movements necessary to 
judge correctly whether the target was present or absent (from the display onset until a correct 
response was given). These analyses determined whether the presence of a familiar face 
within the display interfered with the ongoing task by comparison with a condition in which 
only unfamiliar faces were presented. 
In addition we assessed, for target faces, the effect of the Face’s identity (self-face, friend’s 
face, unfamiliar face) on the first time to arrive at this very face. The first time to arrive at the 
target corresponded to the delay between the display onset and the time point where the eyes 
landed for the first time on the relevant face. Note that, here, the “unfamiliar face” identity 
represents “pure” unfamiliar trials in which no familiar face was present within the display. 
This analysis assessed the existence of a prioritization of processing for the self-face. Finally, 
we examined the effect of the Face’s identity and of its Status (target vs. distractor) on total 
glance duration; a measure defined as the total time spent fixating the face. The unfamiliar 
distractor condition was computed by choosing one unfamiliar face at random among the 
possible unfamiliar distractor faces. This analysis tested whether the self-face holds attention 
more than another face. In order to properly compare targets and distractors, only target 
present trials were taken into account in this analysis. Moreover, only trials in which a correct 
response was given and in which the relevant face was fixated were included in these two 
analyses. 
Trials with anticipatory eye movements (latencies shorter than 80 ms) were excluded from 
analyses. 
Results 
We discarded data of two participants because those participants only had 20% and 23% of 
analysable data (i.e., trials without too early saccades or errors) and we did not include data 
of one participant whose response time and accuracy deviated more than 2.5 SD from the 
mean of the sample. 
RTs. A two-way repeated measures ANOVA with Condition (target present vs. absent) and 
Display type (i.e., the face included in the display: self-face, friend’s face, all unfamiliar 
faces) as factors was conducted on RTs. Condition had a significant effect, F(1,18) = 386.34; 
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p < 0.001, with faster responses when the target was present (M = 1373 ms, SD = 254 ms) 
than when it was absent (M = 1878 ms, SD = 370 ms). Display type also had a significant 
effect, F(2,36) = 3.63; p < 0.05. Planned comparisons indicated that RTs were slower when 
the self-face (M = 1642 ms, SD = 276 ms) and when the friend’s face (M = 1630 ms, SD = 
252 ms) were presented than when only unfamiliar faces (M = 1604 ms, SD = 226 ms) were 
presented, respectively p = 0.018 and p = 0.049. By contrast, RTs were not significantly 
different when the self-face and when the friend’s face were presented, p = 0.47. There was 
no interaction between Condition and Display type, F < 1 (see Figure 3A). 
 
Figure 3. Mean reaction times (A) and mean number of saccades necessary to judge whether 
the target was present or absent (B) as a function of the Condition and of the face contained 
in the display (Display type). Mean reaction times (C) in the target present condition as a 
function of the Status (target vs. distractor) of the familiar faces present within the display. 
Error bars represent SEM. 
Moreover, to specify further the interference caused by the familiar faces as a function of 
their status in the target present condition, we conducted a two-way repeated measures 
ANOVA with Status (target vs. distractor) and Face’s identity (self-face vs. friend’s face) as 
factors. There was no significant effect and no interaction, all Fs < 1 (see Figure 3C). 
Mean number of saccades. We also conducted a 2 (Condition) X 3 (Display type) ANOVA 
on the mean number of saccades. Condition had a significant effect, F(1,18) = 573.56; p < 
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0.001, as fewer saccades were necessary to respond when the target was present (M = 4.51, 
SD = 0.69) than when the target was absent (M = 7.06, SD = 0.84). Display type had no 
significant effect, F < 1, and there was no interaction, F < 1 (see Figure 3B). 
 
Figure 4. Mean time to arrive at a target face as a function of its Identity. Error bars 
represent SEM. 
First time to arrive at the target. In this analysis we determined the first time participants 
arrived with their eyes at the self-face (M = 733 ms, SD = 223 ms), a friend’s face (M = 687 
ms, SD = 153 ms) or an unfamiliar face (M = 744 ms, SD = 96 ms) as targets. A one-way 
repeated measures ANOVA showed no effect of Face’s identity, F < 1 (see Figure 4). 
Total glance duration. A two-way repeated measures ANOVA was performed to determine 
whether there was a difference in glancing at the self-face, a friend’s face and an unfamiliar 
face (Face’s identity) depending on whether it was a target or a distractor (Status). Face’s 
identity affected the total glance duration, F(2,36) = 7.74; p < 0.002. Planned comparisons 
indicated that the self-face (M = 380 ms, SD = 121 ms) and the friend’s face (M = 358 ms, 
SD = 148 ms) were fixated longer than an unfamiliar face (M = 323 ms, SD = 67 ms), p < 
0.001 and p < 0.05, respectively. The two familiar faces did not differ between each other, p 
= 0.14. Status of the face significantly influenced the total glance duration, F(1,18) = 146.46; 
p < 0.001, with target faces (M = 484 ms, SD = 207 ms) being fixated longer than distractor 
faces (M = 224 ms, SD = 58 ms). 
The interaction between Face’s identity and Status was significant, F(2,36) = 3.64; p < 0.05. 
Planned comparisons indicated that the self-face as target was fixated longer than unfamiliar 
target faces, p < 0.001, and that the friend’s face as target only tended to be fixated longer 
than unfamiliar target faces, p = 0.072. The two familiar faces as targets were not 
differentially glanced, p = 0.17. The self-face as distractor was also fixated longer than an 
unfamiliar distractor face, p < 0.02. The other comparisons between identities did not reach 
In press in Cognition.                Important stimuli and allocation of attention 
Status: Postprint (Author’s version) 
 9 
significance, all ps > 0.10. All faces were fixated longer when they were targets than when 
they were distractors, all ps < 0.001 (see Figure 5). 
 
Figure 5. Mean total glance duration on a face as a function of its Status (target vs. 
distractor) and Identity. Error bars represent SEM. 
Discussion 
The first finding is that search in our task was performed in a slow and serial manner (see 
Figure 3A and B; a movie showing a sample of eye movements is also presented as 
supplementary material. (Note that for privacy reasons in this movie the eyes have been 
removed. However this was not the case in the experiment). As is clear from Figure 3, in 
target present trials it took about 1400 ms and 4.5 saccades to respond. In target absent trials 
RTs were about 1900 ms and the search took about 7 saccades. So in other words, there were 
on average 2.5 more saccades in target absent relative to target present trials and all 6 faces 
were serially inspected before a response could be generated in target absent trials. 
Importantly and in line with previous observations (Brédart et al., 2006), the presence of the 
self-face in the display interfered with the ongoing task as participants responded faster to 
displays in which only unfamiliar faces were presented compared to displays in which the 
self-face was present. This effect is even more striking that even if the processing of faces was 
necessary to the task, the face identity was completely task-irrelevant. Critically, here the 
presentation of another familiar face also caused a distraction arguing in favor of a familiarity 
effect rather than a “self effect”. 
Crucially, the current eye movement data allow us to directly determine the cause of this 
interference. Indeed, reaction times data alone could not disentangle whether this effect 
results from the processing of the self-face being prioritized (independently of its relevance 
for the task) or from the self-face holding attention only once it is located within the 
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participant’s focus of attention. So, we first examined whether the self-face automatically 
summons attention in comparison with an unfamiliar face and another highly familiar face. 
We assessed the delay between the onset of the display and the moment a saccade landed for 
the first time on a face. We found no effect of the face’s identity as the time to arrive on a face 
was similar for all three types of faces. Note however that our control study clearly indicates 
that the faces were readily recognizable from the central fixation point. In other words, the 
absence of attentional prioritization cannot be due to insufficient perceptual acuity when 
fixating the middle. Inconsistent with previous findings regarding the own name (Mack & 
Rock, 1998; Wolford & Morrison, 1980) or the self-face (Brédart et al., 2006; Tong & 
Nakayama, 1999), current results thus clearly indicate that the self-face does not benefit from 
attentional prioritization among other faces. Note that in the current study it is critical that we 
examined whether one’s own face would be prioritized among other faces. Previous studies 
have already established that a face among non-face objects receive attentional priority (e.g., 
Ro, Russell, & Lavie, 2001; Theeuwes & Van der Stigchel, 2006). In the current study we 
asked the question whether the features that make up your own face would receive priority 
over faces which do not contain one’s own facial features. Moreover, to establish whether 
such prioritization (if it would have occurred) would be truly bottom-up we ensured that task 
that observers had to perform had nothing to do with face identity as such. 
Even though our findings showing no prioritization of the own face is inconsistent with some 
studies (Mack & Rock, 1998; Wolford & Morrison, 1980; Brédart et al., 2006; Tong & 
Nakayama, 1999), other have reported similar findings showing that one’s own name 
(Bundesen et al., 1997; Harris et al., 2004) or the self-face (Laarni et al., 2000) does not 
summon attention. Therefore, these discrepancies between previous findings as well as the 
present interference effect could be explained by a difficulty to disengage attention from self-
referential/highly familiar stimuli once they are attended, rather than by an attentional 
prioritization. 
This is what we examined in a second analysis of eye movement data. Indeed, total glance 
duration data permit us to directly assess whether the self-face holds attention in comparison 
with an unfamiliar face or with another highly familiar face. We found that overall the self-
face and the friend’s face were fixated longer than unfamiliar faces. By contrast, the total 
glance durations on the self-face and on the friend’s face were similar. Therefore, even if 
familiar faces were not prioritized in visual search (i.e. they were not found faster), they were 
fixated longer once they were located in the participant’s focus of attention. In other words, it 
was more difficult to disengage attention from those familiar faces by comparison with less 
familiar faces. Hence, present data suggests that highly familiar stimuli could just benefit 
from a preferential allocation of attention instead of a bottom-up ability to capture attention. 
We hypothesised that a lack of distinction between the capture and retention components of 
the deployment of attention could resolve apparent contradictions in previous studies. Our 
data thus seem to support this view and indicate that some “self-effects”² found previously 
might also be due to a difficulty to disengage attention rather than to a prioritized processing 
of self-referential stimuli. Indeed, those effects have been found when self-referential stimuli 
that were irrelevant to the ongoing task were located within the focus of attention (Gronau et 
al., 2003; Wolford & Morrison, 1980) but not when located outside the focus of attention 
(Bundesen et al., 1997; Gronau et al., 2003; Laarni et al., 2000), suggesting that they do not 
summon attention. In other words, discrepancies between previous studies could be explained 
in terms of attentional disengagement rather than in terms of the ability to attract attention 
automatically. To put it clearly, “self-effects” found in previous studies could be due to a 
retention of attention by important stimuli in cases where they happened to be within the 
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participant’s focus of attention (e.g. if their location coincided with the location of the target). 
The absence of specific effects of self-referential stimuli might actually have been observed in 
cases where they were located outside the focus of attention and never attended (e.g. for the 
presentation time was too short to allow attention shifting towards peripheral irrelevant 
items). Importantly, similar results in terms of attentional retention have been found with 
other types of important stimuli (i.e. threatening words, see Fox, Russo, Bowles, & Dutton, 
2001). 
We also hypothesised that the extent to which task-irrelevant self-referential stimuli share 
some properties with the task-relevant features might also be important in determining 
specific attentional properties of these stimuli. Present data support this claim since the 
preferential allocation observed for familiar faces was modulated by the stimulus status as 
target or as distractor (as revealed by the Face’s identity by Status interaction on total glance 
duration) even though face identity was completely task-irrelevant. The effect of identity on 
total glance duration was stronger when faces were targets than when they were distractors. 
More specifically, the self-face was fixated longer than unfamiliar faces both when it was a 
target and when it was a distractor. The results for the friend’s face were slightly different 
from that of the self-face. Indeed, the friend’s face tended to be fixated longer than unfamiliar 
faces when it was a target but did not differ from unfamiliar faces when it was a distractor. 
This indicates stronger effects for the self-face than for other highly familiar faces. Note 
however, that it would be too strong to argue in favour of a real “self-effect” because the 
friend’s face overall behaved more like the self-face than like unfamiliar faces. Rather, this 
could be due to a familiarity effect because one may be more familiar with one's own face 
than with the face of a friend³. 
In any case, this modulation of attentional retention by the status of the face is in line with 
findings of previous studies. For instance, it has been shown that self-referential stimuli 
elicited specific effects when their processing was somehow related with the task at hand 
(Brédart et al., 2006; Gronau et al., 2003; Kawahara & Yamada, 2004; Shapiro et al., 1997) 
but not when their processing was totally irrelevant for the task and when they never shared 
relevant properties with the target items (e.g. Bundesen et al., 1997). Kawahara and Yamada 
(2004) introduced the notion of an “input filter” to account for such effects. According to 
them, the input filter prepares the observer to optimise his/her performance on a task and this 
will determine whether a specific feature of a stimulus will attract (or “retain”, we could now 
add) attention or not. They posit that in Bundesen et al.’s (1997) study, which used masked 
presentations of 4-name displays (i.e. two red targets and two white distractors), the own 
name did not attract attention when presented as a distractor because participants tuned their 
input filters to pass the target red items. As a consequence, the white items (and therefore the 
own name as distractor) were not processed. In two experiments, Kawahara and Yamada 
(2004) used an adapted version of the attentional blink paradigm and showed consistent with 
their hypothesis that the own name only attracted attention when participants were set to 
identify target names whereas it did not when participants were set to find a target colour. 
Similarly, in the study by Laarni et al. (2000), the task-irrelevant presentation of the self-face 
did not interfere with the main task. In this study, the self-face appeared in the background 
with target items presented in the foreground (see also Gronau et al., 2003 for similar findings 
with one’s own name). So in that case, the input filter probably included spatial location. 
On the basis of the notion of an input filter, we can explain our results in more general terms. 
First, only task-relevant features (e.g., here the shape of the mouth, the red colour in 
Bundesen et al., 1997) would be selected and processed. At this stage of processing, when the 
task-relevant features do not match those defining the target (e.g. the shape of the mouth 
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displaying an “M” whereas the target is an “O” mouth), other task-irrelevant features of the 
item (e.g., those determining facial identity in the current study or the meaning of the white 
words in Bundesen et al., 1997) will be processed to a lesser extent. This might explain the 
weaker effect of the familiar faces as distractor in the current study as well as the absence of 
any effect of distractors in other studies where distractors’ features never matched the primary 
task (e.g., the white items in Bundesen et al., 1997). When the task-relevant features match 
those defining the target (e.g. when the shape of the mouth is an “O”) then attention engages 
on this stimulus before the participant decides that she has found the target. This engagement 
of attention on target items is reflected by the current data by showing that targets were 
overall fixated about twice as long as distractors and might correspond to a checking process 
before the response is given. This longer processing of the target items would allow a deeper 
processing of this stimulus and as a consequence of its task-irrelevant features (e.g. here, the 
identity of the face). These task-irrelevant features could in turn have a distractive power 
triggering an even longer engagement of attention when they pertain to a highly familiar 
stimulus or a stimulus having a high adaptive importance (e.g. threatening stimuli). 
It has to be mentioned that our results somehow contrast with those of another visual search 
study showing that one’s own face is detected faster than other faces (Tong & Nakayama, 
1999; see also Mack & Rock’s, 1998, visual search study with one’s own name, but see Harris 
et al., 2004). However, in the present study the target was defined on the basis of part-based 
information (i.e., the facial configuration resulting from the pronunciation of a given speech-
sound, so mostly the shape of the mouth). By contrast, in Tong and Nakayama (1999)’s study 
the participant’s own face was the target participants had to search for and it was presented 
among strangers’ faces. In other words, the search concerned facial identity. These opposite 
patterns of results (i.e. increased reaction times in one case and reduced in the other) could 
again be explained by the different attentional set of the participants. Since identity 
information is contained in the configural face information it remains possible that the self-
face and the familiar face would received prioritized processing if search would concern all 
features of a face resulting in a configural attentional set (e.g., search for the face with 
features moved inwards towards the centre of the face)4. Nonetheless, the aim of the present 
experiment was to assess the existence of a bottom-up prioritization of the self-face. So it was 
on purpose that the task set was not identity-related information. Indeed, to establish true 
bottom-up prioritization, what potentially could capture attention (in this case, the face 
identity) should be different from what people look for (in this case a facial configuration). 
For example, in Theeuwes, Hahn, Irwin and Kramer (1998) people searched for a red 
coloured disk while the eyes of the observers were captured by an abrupt onset which was 
completely irrelevant for the task at hand. Similarly, in the present experiment participants 
searched for a facial configuration (i.e., the shape of the mouth) while we examined whether 
identity information (i.e., their own face) would receive attentional priority. Our results 
clearly indicate that it did not. Note however that it is also unlikely that people do not process 
the whole face when they are looking for the configuration of the mouth. Previous research 
has demonstrated that once an object is attended it results in the mandatory processing of all 
attributes of that object (e.g., Kramer & Jacobson, 1991). 
Finally, in general, the present results suggest that attention and foveal inspection are 
necessary to discriminate the fine features defining a target when other complex visual stimuli 
are present (see also Lachter et al., 2004). Therefore, they support an early selection theory of 
attention (see Broadbent, 1958) rather than a later selection theory of attention (Deutsch & 
Deutsch, 1963). Similar conclusions have been reached on the basis of other eye-movement 
studies using scenes (see e.g., Gareze & Findlay, 2007; Underwood, Templeman, Lamming, 
& Foulsham, 2008). For instance, using a comparative search between two images, 
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Underwood et al. (2008) showed that incongruent objects within the context of a scene were 
fixated faster than congruent objects, indicating that the former could be somehow detected 
before being fixated. Nonetheless, those objects received this first saccade only after the scene 
was presented for several seconds and a fixation to the object was necessary for this object to 
be identified. 
In conclusion, we found that a unique and distinctive self-referential stimulus such as the self-
face is not systematically prioritized in comparison to another highly familiar face or even by 
comparison with a less important unfamiliar face. Moreover, we demonstrated for the first 
time that once the self-face is fixated, it holds attention as it seems more difficult to disengage 
attention from it than from a less familiar face. Importantly however, this effect was 
dependent upon the status of the face as target and similar effects were observed with another 




1 To ensure that acuity from fixation was sufficient to recognize the faces at this eccentricity 
we conducted a control experiment with 8 other participants. The design was the same as in 
the main experiment except that one single face was presented at one of the 6 possible 
locations. The five other locations were occupied by grey ovals. The presentation time was 
reduced to 180 ms to prevent participants from making effective saccade and fixating the face. 
The faces were either the participant’s face, one familiar face or 2 unfamiliar faces (displaying 
an “M” in a half of the trials and an “O” in the other half). Each person’s face appeared in 
25% of trials. Participants were to perform a 3-AFC (i.e. “me”, “friend” or “unfamiliar face”) 
identification task. The correct identification rates were 94%, 95% and 96%, respectively, 
indicating that faces were readily recognizable at this eccentricity. 
² For the sake of clarity we refer to the results of previous studies by using the term “self-
effects” because it was generally those effects that were under investigation. Note however 
that in some cases those results might be subtended by familiarity as in the present 
experiment. Indeed, in some previous studies, the lack of comparison between self-referential 
stimuli and other highly familiar stimuli sometimes precluded firm conclusions about the 
factors (i.e. self-reference or high familiarity) that caused attentional biases. 
³ We thank an anonymous reviewer for this suggestion. 
4 We thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing out this possibility. 
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